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IN THE SUPRDIIE COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH

LARRY NICHOLSON,

Plaintiff_,

vs.

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH, AMERICANA
CORPORATION and FIREMAN'S
·FUND INSURANCE COMPANY,

Case No.
9888

Defendants.

BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF

STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is a proceeding under the Industrial Act for
recovery of workmen's compensation benefits claimed
by plaintiff for the loss of an eye arising in the course
of his employment with the defendant, Americana
Corporation.
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DISPOSITION BEFORE THE
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
Hearings were held in this case in October and
November of 1961. On January 17, 1962, the Industrial
Commission made an order denying plaintiff's claim
upon the ground that plaintiff was not an "employee"
entitled to the benefits of the workmen's compensation
laws. Plaintiff thereupon appealed to the Supreme
Court of Utah. The Supreme Court concluded that
plaintiff was an "employee" and on November 26,
1962, handed down its decision reversing the Industrial
Commission. Although evidence had previously been
he~rd on all issues, the defendants sought another hearing on the ground that additional evidence had been
"developed" on the issue of course of employment (R.
8). The Commission set the case for hearing on February 11, 1963, at which time further evidence was
taken. On the 28th day of February, 1963, the Commission made and entered its order by which it found
that plaintiff was not in the course of his employment
at the time of the accident. The order again denied
the benefits of the Compensation Act. Plaintiff petitioned for rehearing and rehearing was denied on March
29, 1963.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The case is before this Court on a writ of certiorari.
Plaintiff seeks reversal of the order of the Industrial
Commission and an order directing judgment in favor
of plaintiff, or that failing, a new hearing.

2
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff's evidence shows that on June 27, 1961,
plaintiff wns removing a sales kit fro1n the rear seat
of his automobile in preparation for a demonstration
of the sales materials. In doing so, he dislodged a seat
cover hook which, when stretched back into place, slipped out of his hand and drove a metal fastener into
his eye. The result was complete loss of sight in his
right eye. Defendants denied liability contending that
plaintiff was not an employee and that the accident did
not occur in the course of employment. This Court in
a previous appeal held that plaintiff was an "employee"
of the defendant within the meaning of the Industrial
Act. Nicholson v. Industrial Commission, 14 Utah 2d 3,
376 P.2d 386. The issue presented in this appeal is
whether or not the Commission has erred in arriving
at a finding that the accident was not employment connected.
At the time of the accident plaintiff was an employee of Americana under an employment agreement
which required him to devote his "entire time and services" to the sale of his employer's publications, and to
represent the employer "in the manner directed" (Exhibit 2). The plaintiff was required by Americana to
furnish his own automobile and the same was used regularly in company business (R. 19, 67). Sales work was
performed by making appointments in advance with
prospective purchasers. The sales presentation (pitch)
was then made in the home. In the course of his work

3
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plaintiff was furnished with a sales demonstration kij
containing materials to be used with the pitch. Tht
sales materials or "broadsides" were withdrawn fron:
the sales kit in a predetermined sequence so as to co·
ordinate the use of visual aids with the pitch.
The accident occurred at the home of a fellow
salesman, Dean Ellis. Nicholson had gone to the Ellis
home in preparation for a sales trip to be taken by
Nicholson and Ellis with the district manager and area
manager of Americana Corporation. As part of the
preparation for this trip Nicholson had planned to
show Ellis a new sales pitch on a publication of the
Americana Corporation known as the "Classics Series."
Ellis had specifically requested of his superiors in the
company that he be instructed on this sales pitch, and
Nicholson had been directed by his area manager and
also the district manager to show the pitch to Ellis.
Plaintiff's evidence shows that the accident occurred
while he was removing the sales kit from the rear seat
of his automobile so that he could show the Classics
pitch to Ellis and arrange the materials therein in proper
order for sales presentations to be made later that day.
Plaintiff explained the accident as follows:
(R. 39-40)
"Q. All right. Then what happened that day?
Starting with the morning, if you will. I think
you said you made some appointments for that
evening?
A. Yes, sir. Well, the events of that day were
briefly I made appointments for later on in the

4
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afternoon, and later on that day I had gone
over to Dean's and cleaned up my car, washed
my car, and swept it out, and then told Deanhe was eating lunch at the time-so I told him
I'd be back in a couple of hours, and I took my
wife to a dentist appointment, picked up some
shirts I had laundered, and come back to Dean's
for business and to arrange our trip, and I told
Dean I was going out to the car to-

Q. Before we get into that. When you returned to his house the second time, and while
you were there is when the accident had occurred;
is that correct?
A. Yes, sir."
(R. 41)
"Q. Now then, after you arrived at his house
the second time, will you relate what happened?

A. I got to the house, and talked to Dean. I
knocked on the door, and he said he was going
to be out in back with his kids, so I says: 'Well,
since we have a little time right now,' he had
asked me to run through the classics-we had
talked about it before-! says: 'Just a minute.
I'll go get the kit, because I'll have to organize
it before I can make a pitch, and also I'll run
through, take a half hour and show you the
classics."
(R. 43)
"Q. Now when you went out to get the kit
from the car, relate exactly what happened.

A. I opened the door on the right-hand side,
pushed the seat forward and slid the kit out,
and on sliding it out, I knocked loose one of the
straps, elasticized straps that hold down the
5
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Terrycloth seat covers-there are, oh, about
or 10 straps that hold it down-and, knockin
it loose, I set the kit on the ground, reached i
to refasten the elasticized strap, which has a litt:
metal "S" hook on it, and in stretching it ot
looking for a place to refasten it, the hook sli1
ped out of my fingers and slipped back to g
into my eye. It pierced my eyelid, going throug
my eye."
This testimony was given at the first hearing on Octobc:
16, 1961. There was no other evidence offered at tha

time as to the details of the accident. There was ev:
dence corroborating the fact that plaintiff and Elli
were due on a sales trip the day of the accident an
that plaintiff had been directed by his superiors to in
struct Ellis on the Classics pitch.
At the final hearing on February 11, 1963, d€
fendants called three witnesses on the issue of cours
of employment: Dean Ellis (an employee of defendan
Americana) and Mr. and Mrs. Leo Linford (estrange1
in-laws of the plaintiff Nicholson).
Though Ellis had never previously testified in th
case, defense counsel sought to show by his testimon:
that he had been coached by plaintiff (R. 18). Thi
effort was unsuccessful. On cross examination, Elli1
as defendant's employee and witness, gave the follov;
ing significant testimony:
(R. 21)

"Q. Now did you associate with Mr. Nicho
son prior to the accident, on a social basis?

6
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A. Uh-uh.

Q. What contact you did have was strictly on
a business basis; is that correct?
A. Yes.
Q. That is you were selling for Americana,
and he was selling for Americana?

A. (N adding head in the affirmative.)
Q. Answer that audibly.
A. Yes."
(R. 24-26)
"Q. Now Mr. Nicholson was down at your
home on the day of the accident? Was that correct.
A. Yes.
Q. Why was he there?

A. Well~ basically to get me and get ready for
this trip~ and then he was going to show me this
stuff too.
Q. Were you making a sales trip on that day?

A. Yes. They were waiting for us in Brigham.
Q. For Americana?
A. Well, both. Americana and, if I learned,
the Harvard Classics. If I got it by then.
Q. Well, the Classics was being sold by the
Americana people; is that correct?

A. Yes.
Q. So this trip was being taken for the purpose of selling the books of the Americana Company?

7
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A. Yes.
Q. And when you say they were waiting for
you in Brigham City, this is Gene Smith and
Harry Pledger and one other salesman; is that
correct?

A. I don't know if it was one or two. But
some of the office from Ogden.
Q. Now was there any other reason at all for
Mr. Nicholson to be at your home on that day?

A. No.
Q. Now he came twice that day to your home,
didn't he?

MR. CHRISTENSEN: I'm going to object
here to your leading, Mr. Macfarlane.
MR. MACFARLANE: It's your witness.
THE REFEREE: Go ahead.
A. What?
MR. MACFARLANE: Q. Mr. Nicholson
had been to your home twice on that day, hadn't
he?

A. Yes.
Q. And the first timeA. Well, yes, he was there twice. Totally.
Q. And the first time he came to your home
you were eating lunch; is that correct?

A. Yes.
Q. About what time was that?

A. I don't remember exactly. It was in the
afternoon sometime. We eat lunch there, you
8
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know, as a rule it's not 12:00 o'clock, because
we run an orchard, and it was later in the afternoon, but I don't know exactly what time.
Q. All right. Did he leave, after he came and
found you eating your lunch?
A. Well, he went out and straightened up
his car, and then went to pick up his wife."

(R. 27-31)
"Q. Now then, after he straightened up his
car he did leave, and then subsequently returned
to your place ; is that correct?

A. Uh-huh.
Q. When he returned, where were you?

A. In the house.
Q. What were you doing in the house?

A. I don't know.
Q. Had you made any preparations for this
trip?
A. Yes.
Q. Did you have a sales kit?

A. Just after he came I went out and got my
sales kit, and was finishing straightening it up.
You always go through your sales kit before you
go on a trip, so you can make a presentation in a
house. And I went out on the back lawn. Now I
may have even been out on the back lawn when
he came. I don't know whether this was when he
came, or just after, or what.
Q. Well, when he arrived at your house, were
you or had you just been in the course of preparing your sales kit for this trip?

9
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A. Yes.
Q. And in preparing your sales kit, it is necessary to take the materials out and arrange them
in a specific order; is that correct?
A. Yes.
Q. And then you put new contracts and new
what they call broadsides into the kit itself; is
that correct?
A. Yes.
Q. And this is what you were doing when
Larry came the second time?
A. Yes.
Q. Now when he came up to your house the
second time, did he come up to the front door and
knock? Or do you know?
A. I guess.
Q. Did you have a conversation with him?
A. Yes.
Q. And do you recall the substance of that
conversation?
A. As to the detail, or to-Just that I was to
go get my stuff ready~ and he was going to get
his stuff and come around~ and that was basically
it.
Q. Now when you say he was going to get his
stuff~ what do you mean by that?
A. His kit. Out of his car.
Q. Now did he ever return with his kit?
A. No.
Q. And what is the next thing that you knew?
A. My wife came out to the back door and
hollered that Larry had been hurt~ and this was

10
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about, oh, several minutes later. I mean it didn,t
just happen, you know, bang, bang. Two or
three minutes later my wife came out, and I wondered where Larry was. I thought it was him,
but she said he was hurt. Then I went in the
house, and he was lying on the front room floor,
with blood all over his face.

*

*

*

Q. And where was the sales kit, Mr. Nicholson's kit, when you returned?
A. Well, Larry had asked me to go back and
get the stuff that was out on the lawn. The stuff
he had out.
Q. Now where with reference to the door of
the automobile, or the automobile of Mr. Nicholson, was the sales kit? I know you don,t know
how many inches or how many feet, but was it
close, or far_, orA. Well, it was there by the side of the car.
Q. Now you and Mr. Nicholson were going to
make a trip to Brigham City later that day to sell
Americana, and that was why Mr. Nicholson was
there; is that correct?
A. Yes.
Q. Now do you know whether or not Mr.
Nicholson was going to show you the Classics on
that day?
A .Yes.
Q. Was he?
A. Yes.
Q. Was he going to show you the Classics before this sales trip was made?
A. Yes.,, (Emphasis added).

11
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Defendants apparently contend that the accident
occurred while Nicholson was engaged in installing
a new set of seat covers on his automobile. In support
of this contention defendants called Leo and Lorna
Linford, former in-laws of Nicholson. Neither of these
people had any personal knowledge of the circumstances of the accident but testified as to purported
admissions made by Nicholson following the accident.
Lorna Linford testified that Nicholson told her:
(R. 36-37)

" ... he had been washing his car and putting
this new seat cover on. He said he was just on
the last part when this pin that hooks the seat
cover flipped and hit him in the eye."
Defense counsel asked Mrs. Linford if Nicholson had
ever used the word "coached" with reference to his
conversations with Ellis, and she replied, "I don't recall" (R. 37). Counsel asked if Nicholson ever used
the term that he was going to "work out an angle,"
and Mrs. Linford replied, "I don't recall right now.
I don't know" (R. 38). Defense counsel was then permitted over timely objection to, in effect, impeach his
own witness by referring her to a statement she had
given to Fireman's Fund Insurance Company in November of 1962, whereupon she testified that Nicholson
had said "he was going to work it so that he would get
more for his eye" and "he was going to take the insurance company for all they were worth" (R. 39-40).
Mrs. Linford testified that she contacted the insurance

12
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company on her own initiative in November of 1962
(R. 40).
The cross examination of Mrs. Linford was very
revealing. After the first hearings in October and
November of 1961 and before November of 1962 when
the Linfords contacted Fireman's Fund Insurance
Company, several significant events occurred. Nicholson
had been married to Linfords' daughter, Darlene. They
were divorced in the fall of 1961 (R. 41). Darlene went
to California and the two children of the marriage
(Curtis and Sherry) remained with the Linfords in
their home (R. 41). The Linfords were very attached
to these children. In December of 1961, Nicholson
took custody of Curtis, though the Linfords were very
much opposed to allowing him to take the child from
their home (R. 43). Mrs. Linford acknowledged that
there was a feeling of "animosity and bitterness" that
developed as a result of the divorce and Nicholson's
assumption of the custody of his child (R. 44). Nicholson continued to visit his daughter, Sherry, at the Linford home, but notwithstanding his requests he was
not permitted to take the child at any time for a full
day (R. 45). Meanwhile, Darlene was sent to prison
in California for misapplication of bank funds (R. 46).
Mrs. Linford testified that she felt Nicholson was to
blame for the divorce of her daughter and that he was
also to blame for the trouble Darlene got into in California (R. 46-47). In August of 1962, Mrs. Linford
took Sherry to California with her to visit Darlene
(R. 47). She planned to stay "a week or a little longer"

13
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(R. 47). Upon learning that his child was to be taken
out of the state, Nicholson filed a petition for custody
of Sherry in the District Court of Weber County naming the Linfords as defendants. Mrs. Linford learned
of the petition when she arrived in California and she
stayed there for two n1onths moving from place to place
because of the "trouble he was causing" (R. 50). Darlene was released from prison in October of 1962, and
Mrs. Linford remained in California with her a while,
moving from Los Angeles to San Francisco (R. 53) .
She then left Darlene, instructing her not to tell Nicholson where she was (R. 53). Mrs. Linford returned to
Utah with the custody of Sherry still very much in
her mind. Asked as to her attitude in November of
1962 (when the insurance company was contacted),
Mrs. Linford testified:
(R. 55-56)
"Q. Yours was an attitude of considerable
bitterness toward Mr. Larry Nicholson at that
time, was it not?

A. For all the expense and trouble he had
caused. He had called our home, and threatened
that he would u,se every cent that he would get
from this insurance company to do everything he
could.
Q. So that in contacting the insurance company, your motive wp,s to hurt him at that time;
isn,t that correct?

A. For all he had put 1ts through, yes.
Q. And isn't it a fact that you had told him on
14
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many occasions prior to November of 1962, that
you hoped that he would get his money? That
he was entitled to it?
A. I hoped he got something from it, yes. Because he was entitled for having his eye hurt.
Q. Didn't you tell him you thought he was
entitled to be compensated?

A. To get something, yes . . . " (Emphasis
added).
Mrs. Linford was apparently concerned as to how
Nicholson would use the money he got from the insurance company. Notwithstanding her instruction to
Darlene not to communicate with Larry, Darlene called
Larry and arranged to place Sherry in her father's
custody ( R. 54-55) . Both Curtis and Sherry were in
their father's custody at the time of the second hearing.
Leo Linford was called by defendants pursuant to
subpoena. Defense counsel stated at the commencement
of the hearing that Leo Linford had called him from
Ogden about 7:00 o'clock a.m. that morning to advise
counsel that Linford "had only a little French car
and the highway patrol was not letting sports cars on
the highway" and that Mrs. Linford "was in California" and "not available at the present time" (R. 13,
14). Counsel advised Linford that he would have
to contact the Industrial Commission to be excused.
Shortly after the commencement of the hearing, which
started at 9:00 o'clock a.m., Linford and his wife walked
into the hearing room (See R. 21) .

15
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The exclusion rule had been invoked and Linford
did not have the opportunity to hear his wife testify
before he took the stand. His wife had testified that
she and her husband took the initiative in contacting
the insurance company in November of 1962 (R. 40).
Leo Linford said that he didn't remember whether he
contacted the insurance company or whether the company contacted him ( R. 66, 67) , though he did remember clearly some purported conversations that took
place a year prior to the contact with the insurance
company ( R. 67) .
Leo Linford testified over objection that he "believed" that Dean Ellis was in the hospital room on
the day of the accident along with Nicholson's parents
( R. 61 ) and that Ellis "said that Larry Nicholson
was putting seat covers on his car, after having washed
it, and that the last hook that he had to fasten didn't
make the connection and sprung out and hit him in
the eye" (R. 63). Linford said that Larry later told
him "the same story" (R. 64). Linford also stated that
Nicholson said "he had worked out an angle" (R. 64}
and that he was "going to have to work on Mr. Ellis."
Linford said he thought the latter conversation took
place after the first hearing in October of 1961 (R. 66).
Linford's cross examination, like that of his wife,
disclosed that there was a great deal of antagonism
between him and Larry as a result of the divorce, his
daughter's imprisonment and the custody fight for
Nicholson's two children (R. 70-72).

16
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Larry Nicholson was called at the final hearing and
he testified again that he went to the Ellis home twice
on the day of the accident. On the first occasion Ellis
was eating his lunch and so Nicholson washed his car
and cleaned it out lightly (R. 77). Nicholson then left
to handle some personal business, after which he re·
turned again to the Ellis home (R. 77) . On the second
occasion he took no action to clean the car or set it in
order (R. 78). Defense counsel objected to going into
the details of the accident since Nicholson's testimony
was already in the record from the first hearing (about
16 months before) (R. 78). Plaintiff's counsel refrained
from again eliciting the details of the accident from
Nicholson upon the assurance from the Commissioner
that the earlier testimony would be reviewed and considered in deciding the case (R. 78. See also R. 12).
Nicholson testified that the seat covers were not
new and that he had purchased them several months
before (R. 79). This was corroborated by Ellis (R.
17). He said that when the custody fight was initiated
in August of 1962, Leo Linford threatened to shoot
him (R. 81). He denied that he had told the Linfords
that he was putting on new seat covers when the accident occurred or that he had said he was working an
angle or coaching Ellis (R. 79-80) .
Larry Nicholson's father, Robert A. Nicholson,
testified that in August of 1962, Leo Linford called him
and told him that he (Linford) "had told Larry what
he would do to him. He advised me to keep Larry away
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from him. That he was certainly going to even the score"
(R. 83-84). Larry's father testified that Linford called
him again (during the course of the custody fight) and
told him how upset he was with Larry (R. 84). Robert
Nicholson denied that the Linfords were ever in the
hospital room with him and his wife and Larry (R. 87)
and testified that the Linfords had never had any discussion with Larry about the accident in Mr. Nicholson's presence (R. 87).
Ellis was recalled and testified that he never told
the Linfords that the accident occurred while seat covers
were being installed (R. 91). He said that Larry had
not told him what to say or how to say it (R. 91).
At the close of the evidence the case was taken
under advisement, and on the 28th day of February
the Commission handed down its decision whereby it
concluded that Nicholson was not in the course of his
employment at the time of the accident.
This appeal challenges that finding.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE ORDER. OF THE COMMISSION
SHOWS ON ITS FACE THAT THE COMMISSION, CONTRARY TO THE STIPULATED
PLAN OF PROCEDURE, IGNORED THE
EVIDENCE OFFERED AT THE FIRST
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liEARING AND ERRONEOUSLY INTERPRETED THE EVIDENCE RECEIVED AT
THE FINAL HEARING.
Plaintiff's testimony on the occurrence of the accident was taken before Roland G. Robinson, Jr., referee,
on October 16, 1961. The final hearing on February
11, 1963, was conducted by Commissioner Otto A.
Wiesley. At the commencement of that hearing the
following understanding was had between counsel and
the referee:
(R. 12)

"MR. MACF All-LANE: As I understand it,
the purpose of this hearing is in effect the reopening of the record, to take additional evidence
on the issue of course of employment.
MR. CHRISTENSEN: Right.
THE REFEREE: Yes.
MR. MACFARLANE: And we would expect, if it's agreeable with the Commission, that
all evidence heretofore received would be considered in determining that question, together
with what additional evidence might be adduced
at this time.
MR. CHRISTENSEN: Yes.
THE REFEREE: That is absolutely necessary. The whole record is in evidence.
MR. CHRISTENSEN:
stood that.

Yes. We under-

THE REFEREE: You may proceed then,
Mr. Christensen."
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During the course of the hearing plaintiff's counsel
sought to review some of the testimony of Nicholson
pertaining to the details of the accident, and the following .discussion took place :
(R. 78)
"Q. And why were you there on the second
occasion?

MR. CHRISTENSEN: I'm going to object
to all this as repetitious.
A. Company business.
MR. CHRISTENSEN: The whole thing
is in the original transcript.
THE REFEREE: I haven't read the transcript for some time. I wouldn't remember.
MR. CHRISTENSEN: I read it last night,
Mr. Commissioner. It was there then.
THE REFEREE: If it is in the record,
Mr. Macfarlane, of course we'll agree no purpose can be served by repeating it now.
MR. MACFARLANE: Will your practice
be, Mr. Wiesley, to await the preparation of a
transcript in this hearing, and then read it all
over and consider it all?
THE REFEREE: Oh, yes. We'd have to,
yes.
MR. MACFARLANE: All right."
It was thus clear that all of the testimony previously
offered on the issue of course of employment was to
be considered by the Commission in arriving at a findIng.
20
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The order of the Commission demonstrates that
the testimony offered at the first hearing was ignored.
The first paragraph of the order discussing the evidence
says:

(R. 94)
"l\Ir. Ellis (companion salesman) testified
that the eye injury occurred when applicant
went to get his stuff (sales kit) out of the car.

It seems more probable that a pin would flip
and strike an eye during the process of pinning
seat covers than when removing a sales kit from
a car.~~ (Emphasis added).
Plaintiff gave the following testimony at the first hearIng:

(R. 43)
"A. I opened the door on the right-hand side,
pushed the seat forward and slid the kit out, and
on sliding it out I knocked loose one of the
straps, elasticized straps that hold down the
Terrycloth seat covers-there are, oh, about 8
or 10 straps that hold it down-and, knocking
it loose, I set the kit on the ground, reached in
to refasten the elasticized strap, which has a little
metal "S" hook on it, and in stretching it out
looking for a place to refasten it, the hook slipped
out of my fingers and slipped back to go into
my eye. It pierced my eyelid, going through my
eye."
The quoted portion of
that the commissioners
to be that the strap in
into his eye when the

the Commission's order shows
assumed applicant's contention
some unexplained way flipped
kit was being removed. Such
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an assumption could not have prevailed had the Commission considered the testimony offered at the first hearing. The damaging nature of the unwarranted assumption is obvious. The possibility of a fastener striking
an eye while removing the kit from the vehicle is remote.
The prospect of injury in refastening the strap is just
as great as the prospect of injury in initially installing
the strap.
The order next recites:
(R. 95)

"It was never established why the sales kit was
outside the car on the ground, but nearby, after
the injury occurred. It may have been placed
there by applicant so he could go about installing seat covers. He may have dropped them
there following the eye injury. Had his eye been
struck while removing the kit from the car, he
most likely would have dropped them instantly
in the car."
There are only two possible explanations for a statement such as this: Either ( 1) the Commission failed
to consider plaintiff's testimony, or ( 2) the Commission
did not exercise good faith in reviewing the record. We
choose to believe the first alternative. Either would be
grounds for reversal. Contrary to the order, it was
established why the sales kit was outside the car on
the ground after the injury occurred. After testifying
that a strap was dislodged as the sales kit was slid out,
Nicholson said:
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(R. 43)

"I set the kit on the ground, reached in to
refasten the elasticized strap, which has a little
metal "S" hook on it, and in stretching it out
looking for a place to refasten it, the hook slipped
out of my fingers and slipped back to go into my
eye."
Not having considered this testimony the Commission
could not understand why the kit did not drop instantly
in the car.
Thus, in failing to review or to consider the plaintiff's testimony the Commission was laboring under the
following false and unwarranted assumptions:

(1) That plaintiff contended the accident to
have occurred when the sales kit was slid
out of the automobile;
(2) That plaintiff made no explanation of the
presence of the kit outside of the automobile.

These false assumptions led to the conclusions (a)
that it was more probable that a pin would flip into
plaintiff's eye while attaching seat covers than while
removing a kit from the car; (b) that had the accident
occurred as plaintiff contended, he would have naturally
dropped the kit in the car; and (c) that the presence
of the kit outside of the car actually corroborated the
contention that planitiff was installing seat covers at
the time of the accident. The foregoing conclusions were
all fundamental to the determination which the Commission made and were all based upon false assumptions
23
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which could not have been made had the Commission
considered the testimony offered at the first hearing.
The order of the Commission also shows a careless
appraisal of the testimony of the Linfords. In reviewing
such testimony the order says:
(R. 95)

"She testified that she took the initiative in
conveying the information to the insurance adjuster after the divorce of her daughter from
the applicant. One would not expect a motherin-law to volunteer such information when family relations are as they should be. One might,
after a divorce and bitter feelings generated over
custody of children."
The evidence was that the divorce occurred in the
fall of 1961. There was no testimony to the effect that
the divorce proceedings followed the hearings of October and November, 1961. This was not the fact. Though
we do not consider this to be of great importance, it
appears from the foregoing portion of the order that
the Commission considered the date of the divorce to be
important and acted on an erroneous assumption in that
regard.
The order of the Commission next reads:
(R. 95)

"We doubt that she [Mrs. Linford] would so
readily have admitted taking the initiative in
conveying information to the insurance adjuster
if it were not factual."
24
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This statement is incredibly naive and contradictory.
It assumes that the witness (Mrs. Linford) would have
lied about contacting the insurance company if the
information she had was not factual and that the very
fact that she admitted making the initial contact with
the insurance company bolsters her credibility. Mrs.
Linford perhaps concluded that she was not in a position to deny that she made the initial contact with the
insurance adjuster confronting her at the hearing.
Further, she had every reason to give the insurance
company information which would prevent Nicholson
from succeeding in his claim. She was forced to admit
the bitter and hostile attitude she had toward Larry.
A custody battle in which the Linfords were vitally
interested was being waged at the time. Mrs. Linford
testified that Nicholson had threatened to use the money
he obtained in the settlement in carrying on the battle.
There was ample explanation for her initiative in contacting the insurance company. It is interesting to note
that rather than believe that Mrs. Linford was motivated by her admitted desire to "hurt Larry" ( R. 56) ,
the Commission finds that she must have been telling
the truth because otherwise she would have lied about
contacting the adjuster herself.
In the very next paragraph of the order the Commission acknowledges that "the father-in-law said the
insurance adjuster solicited the information rather than
he and his wife had taken the initiative." No comment
is made on this finding, but under the process of reasoning followed in the preceding paragraph of the Com-
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mission's order it follows that one of the Linfords is
not telling the truth and that the rest of their testimony
is therefore unworthy of belief (R. 95). Actually the
evidence showed that the father-in-law "could not remember" who made the contact (R. 66, 67). Having
concluded, as it did however, and considering the weight
apparently placed on the initial contact, it is difficult
to see how the Commission could reconcile the conflicting statements of these two witnesses upon which it
bases the entire order. The Commission also ignores
the fact that Leo Linford obviously lied to Mr. Christensen when he told him on the morning of the hearing
that Mrs. Linford was in California and would be unable
to attend the hearing that morning (R. 13, 14, 21).
The order of the C9mmission next says:
(R. 95)

"Applicant testified that to the best of his
recollection he told his family that he got the
hook into his eye when attempting to refasten
the seat cover. This occurred at the hospital."
The applicant did not testify that he had any such
conversation at the hospital. On the contrary, he was
under sedation at the time the Linfords claim to have
visited him in the hospital room and not able to discuss
the accident (R. 79). He did testify that in explaining
the accident he simply said that the injury occurred
while attempting to refasten the seat cover hook (R.
79).

The Commission next finds:
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(R. 95)

"In spite of the family differences over the
divorce and custody of the children, we choose
to believe the testimony of Lorna Linford and
her husband, Leo George Linford."
It is submitted that a reading of the opinion will
demonstrate that the Commission "chose" to believe
the Linfords without considering the testimony of
Nicholson. But what significance lies in the testimony
of the Linfords? If true, the Commission could believe
that Nicholson admitted that he was putting on seat
covers at the time of the accident; that he had an
"angle," and that he was going to get Ellis to go along
with him. None of these conclusions should defeat recovery. Nicholson was in the act of fastening a seat
cover hook. If he said he was going to work "an angle,"
this cannot be fairly construed to mean that the claim
was fabricated or fraudulent without some explanation
of the details. Fraud and fabrication are not proved
in such a manner. The statement that he was going to
"work on Ellis" also falls short of the evidentiary
requirements of proof of fraud and fabrication. In
believing the Linfords the Commission received no
assistance whatever as what actually occurred at the
time Nicholson lost his eye. Neither of the Linfords
were present or claim to have any personal knowledge
of the circumstances of the accident, and the Commission failed to take into account that the defense witness
Ellis (who was defendant's employee at the time of
the accident) corroborated plaintiff's version of the
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accident. Instead of taking this into account, the Commission saw fit to comment that Ellis (a defense witness) was "evasive" (R. 95) and to attach that stigma
to plaintiff.
Finally, the Commission concludes that Nicholson
was not in the course of his employment (a) because
he and Ellis were not on their way to Brigham City
at the time of the injury; (b) because replacing or
fastening seat covers was not done in the course of
employment; and (c) because the instruction in the
sale of Classics had not begun at the time of the accident.
Such conclusions callously ignore the fact that no sales
presentation could be made and no instructions on the
Classics pitch commenced until the sales kit was removed from the rear seat of plaintiff's automobile,
and that as an incident to the removal of the kit plaintiff was required to replace a fastener dislodged by the
removal of the kit. The accident was thus occasioned
as a direct result of necessary employment connected
activity.
There is not a single paragraph of the Commission's order (following the J:eCital of the history of the
case) which does not contain significant error. It is
respectfully submitted that the Commission "chose"
to decide this case for the defendants on the basis of
the final hearing only, without consideration of the evi·
dence offered at the first hearing and without a fair
and impartial consideration of the evidence received at
the final hearing.
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POINT II.
THE UNDISPUTED EVIDENCE COMPELS A FINDING THAT THE PLAINTIFF
\VAS IN THE COURSE OF HIS EMPLOY1\IENT AT THE TIME OF THE ACCIDENT.
The Industrial Commission acts in excess of its
powers when it arbitrarily disregards or unreasonably
refuses to believe material, substantial, competent and
uncontradicted evidence. Dale v. Industrial Commission) 115 Utah 311, 204 P.2d 462; Jones v. California
Packing Corp.J 121 Utah 612, 244 P .2d 640; Woodburn v. Industrial Comrn.~ I l l Utah 393, 181 P.2d 209.
This is such a case.
A review of the entire record establishes the following undisputed facts. When Nicholson was employed by Americana, he was required to furnish his
own automobile. He used his automobile in his work
and it was essential to the performance of his duties.
The district manager of the defendant, as well as
Nicholson and Ellis, testified that a sales trip to Brigham City had been planned for the day of the accident.
Nicholson was to take his automobile on this trip, and
Ellis was to take his. Nicholson went to the Ellis home
on the day of the accident to prepare for the trip.
Nicholson had no reason to go to the Ellis home except
for business purposes, and his sole motive in going there
on the day of the accident was to instruct Ellis on the
Classics pitch and prepare for the sales trip.
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The accident occurred while Nicholson was fastenIng a seat cover hook. Nicholson testified that the
hook was being refastened after having become dislodged by the sales kit, and defendants apparently contend that a set of seat covers was being installed. In
either event, preparations for the sales trip were under
way. Nicholson had embarked upon his work in going
to Ellis' home to arrange his sales kit and demonstrate
the Classics pitch. The accident occurred under plaintiffs' evidence as an incident to removal of the sales
kit from his automobile. Under defendants' theory it
occurred while plaintiff was conditioning his car for use.
The Commission recognized that Nicholson's trip
to the Ellis home was in contemplation of a sales trip
( R. 95) , but concluded that the accident was not within
the scope of the Act because the trip had not actually
started and instruction on the Classics pitch had not
commenced ( R. 95) . This narrow construction of the
Act is not in accordance with the cases.
Our statute permits recovery for injury "arising
out of or in the course of . . . employment, wheresoever
such injury occurred" ( §35-1-45, U.C.A., 1953). The
words "arising out of" refer to the origin or cause of
injury, and the words "in the course of" refer to the
time, place and circumstances of the injury. Utah Apex
Mining Company v. Industrial Commission_, 67 Utah
537, 248 Pac. 490. This Court has held that the statute
should be liberally construed and that if there is any
doubt respecting the right to compensation, such doubt
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should be resolved in favor of recovery. Chandler v.
Industrial Commission .. 55 Utah 213, 184 Pac. 1020;
Ill & 1( Corp. v. Industrial Commission_, 112 Utah 488,
189 p .2d 132.
Clearly if the accident occurred as an incident to
removal of the sales kit, it "arose out of" and "in the
course of" employment. Under the circumstances of
this case it cannot in good faith be contended that transportation and removal of the kit was not employment
connected. These were essential acts in the performance
of the employer's work, and incidents directly connected
with such acts are likewise employment connected.
Plaintiff contends that the Commission was arbitrary
and capricious in refusing to adopt Nicholson's version
of the accident because his testimony was corroborated
by defendant's own witness and employee. The testimony of Ellis established (I) that Nicholson had come
to his home solely for a business purpose; ( 2) that
Ellis had requested instruction on the Classics pitch
and Nicholson had agreed to furnish it; (3) that Nicholson and Ellis discussed preparations for the trip upon
Nicholson's arrival; ( 4) that Nicholson went out to
his car to get his sales kit; ( 5) that "two or three minutes" later Ellis' wife came to him to report that Nicholson had been injured; ( 6) that Nicholson was found
by Ellis with his injured eye, and (7) that Nicholson's
sales kit was found beside his car after the accident.
The defendants should be bound by the testimony of
their witness in the foregoing important particulars.
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The contention that the Commission acted arbitrarily does not ignore the testimony of the Linfords.
Such testimony is in the category of that referred to in
Jones on Evidence (2nd Ed.) , page 620:
"It is a familiar rule that verbal admissions
should be received with caution and subjected
to careful scrutiny, as no class of evidence is
more subject to error or abuse. Witnesses having
the best motives are generally unable to state
the exact language of an admission, and are
liable, by the omission or the changing of words,
to convey a false impression of the language
used. No other class of testimony affords such
temptations or opportunities for unscrupulous
witnesses to torture the facts or commit open
perjury, as it is often impossible to contradict
their testimony at all, or at least by any other
witness than the party himself. These and similar
considerations have often led the courts to declare that admissions are evidence of low grade
-the weakest and most unsatisfactory form of
evidence.''
It is the rule in many juris dictions that admissions
inconsistent with a party's testimony go merely to the
credibility of the witness and have no probative value
as direct evidence. Eastman v. Lake Shore & M. S.
Ry. Co., 101 Mich. 597, 60 N.W. 309; Allen v. Large}
239 S.W. 2d 225; Gams v. Oberholtzer~ 50 Wash. 2d
174, 310 P.2d 240. Under this rule Nicholson's testimony as corroborated by Ellis stands uncontradicted
by direct evidence. If the testimony of the Linfords
is given the probative force of direct evidence, such
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testimony when analytically considered still does not
impeach the evidence offered by Nicholson and Ellis.
But even assuming, arguendo, that the plaintiff
was installing or replacing seat covers at the time of his
accident, such work, under the circumstances of this
case, was still within the scope of the Act. It is undisputed that plaintiff was making preparations for a
sales trip and that he was to use his own automobile
in connection with such trip. He had embarked upon
his master's business in going to the Ellis home with a
business motive. The fact that he may have been conditioning his own automobile is not fatal to his cause.
In Struve v. City of Fremont~ 125 Neb. 463, 250
N.W. 663, the applicant was killed by carbon monoxide
gas while tuning up his ·automobile used principally in
the employer's business. The accident occurred early
in the morning while the applicant was "preparing'~
to attend a convention in his employer's business. The
court said:
"The deceased was preparing his car to carry
him to his fireman's duty, it matters not whether
to his morning inspection or to Omaha to his
fireman's school."
It was held that the accident was within the scope of
his employment.
In Green v. Hiestand Bros.~ et al.~ 103 Pa. Super.
Ct. 515, 157 Atl. 44, the employee, a traveling salesman,
was repairing his car in order to complete his employ-
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ment for the day and in doing so was overcome by carbon monoxide gas. In holding that the accident was in
the course of employment, the court said:
"We think the only legitimate inferences to
be drawn ... are that the decedent's employment
for July 9, 1930, had not been terminated at the
time of his accidental death and that the accident
happened while he was repairing an instrumentality (necessary to the proper rendition of the
services required of him) preparatory to going
to the Noel Bakery to make a collection for his
employers."
In Derleth v. Roach & Seeber Co.~ 227 Mich. 258,
198 N.W. 948, the employee suffered an accident while
preparing his own automobile for use on the following
day in connection with his employment. He was testing
his batteries in order to insure that he would be able
to make the trip by automobile. The court held that the
accident arose out of and in the course of his employment.
In Kingsley v. Donovan~ 169 App. Div. 828, 155
N.Y. Supp. 801, the employee used a motorcycle in
going to and from work. He received an injury while
engaged in cleaning the motorcycle after arrival at
work, and the New York court held that the accident
was compensable.
In Hilyard v. Lohmann-Johnson Drilling Co., 167
Kan. 177, 211 P .2d 89, the employee was working on
his own personal car which had no connection with his
employment whatever. It was shown, however, to be

34

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

common custom for employees to work on their per;onal cars in their spare time while on the job. In determining that the accident occurred "in the course of"
employment, the court simply commented that at the
time the claimant sustained his injuries he was in his
employer's services. The court then went on to conclude
that the accident also "arose out of" the employment.
In so holding the court said:

1

" ... At 58 Am. Jur., Workmen's Compensation, § 235, it is said: 'An injury is not necessarily rendered noncompensable by the fact that
at the time of its occurrence the employee was
engaged in the performance of some act for the
benefit of himself or a third person, since such
an act may, in many instances, be so related
to or connected with the employment as to make
it a reasonable incident thereof.' . . . It is not
essential that the employee be engaged in an act
directly beneficial to his employer in order that
the resulting injury may be said to have arisen
out of the employment, and the fact that the
employee's action may have been impelled by a
personal motive does not prevent the application
of the compensation statute.

*

*

*

"The words 'causal connection' certainly do
not mean that the accident must have resulted
directly and immediately from performance of
the work for which the workman was employed.
Such a narrowed interpretation would mean that
~henever a workman was not directly engaged
In the actual work to be done he would be without
'~
protection under the law.
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An analysis of the entire record reveals that regardless of the motive and the reason for fastening the seat
cover strap, Nicholson was in preparation for sales
services and was working on an instrumentality necessary for use in such services. He had gone to the Ellis
home with one motive, and that was in furtherance of
his work with the defendant Americana.
Though it may be argued that there would be
personal benefit to Nicholson in placing his own personal automobile in order, it cannot be logically contended that this had no connection whatever with his
employment. The law does not require that the salesman be actually engaged in the sale of books at the time
an injury occurs. Preparation of the automobile was a
necessary incident to his employment. We understand
the general rule to be that even where an act incidental
to employment is performed for the employee's benefit,
it will not preclude compensation. This rule is stated in
99 C.J.S. 744-745 as follows:
" ... The fact that the incidental act which
caused the injury was performed for the employee's benefit will not necessarily preclude
compensation where the act was performed in
the course of employment or where such activity
had become an incident to the employment. ...
It is not essential that the employee be engaged
in an act directly beneficial to his employer in
order that the resulting injury may be said to
have arisen out of the employment, and the fact
that the employee's action may have been im·
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pelled by a personal motive does not prevent the
application of the compensation statute.

*

*

*

"Where the employee is primarily engaged in
carrying out his employer's purposes, and his
conduct for personal reasons is merely incidental
thereto, he is acting in the course of his employment. Where the act is within the employment,
it is immaterial that the predominate motive of
the employee is to benefit himself.... "
It is earnestly submitted that a review of the entire
record compels the conclusion that the accident arose
out of or in the course of Nicholson's employment with
Americana.

POINT Ill.
THE COMMISSION ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN THE CONDUCT OF THE
HEARING AND ERRED IN REFUSING TO
GRANT PLAINTIFF'S PETITION FOR REHEARING.
A review of the entire transcript of the final hearing will demonstrate that the Linfords, whose testimony
forms the basis of the Commission's order, were apparently reluctant to appear at the hearing. They had
contacted the insurance company during the heat of a
custody battle and furnished written statements. Then
at the time of the hearing when it became necessary
for them to go under oath and testify, Mr. Linford
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called counsel with a flimsy excuse for his own inability
to attend and an apparent untruth about his wife being
out of the state. The record will show that Mrs. Linford
would not state under oath the claim she apparently
initially made to the insurance company until defense
counsel was permitted to in effect impeach her by asking
leading questions and referring her to a statement taken
for the defendants' own use (R. 37-40). Though we
recognize that the Commission is not bound by formal
rules of evidence, it appears to the plaintiff that it was
an abuse of the Commission's discretion for it to allow
testimony which it considered so vital to be wrung out
of defense witnesses by impeachment tactics.
The record also shows the impatience of the Commission in permitting a broad scope of cross examina·
tion of the Linfords (R. 46, 50, 51, 72). Further, it
appears that defendants' request to offer additional
evidence following the first appeal was readily granted
(R. 8, 9), whereas plaintiff's request for a rehearing
to offer additional evidence was promptly denied (R.
96, 97, 99) . Taking the record as a whole, plaintiff con·
tends that he was deprived of a fair hearing of the
Issues.

CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted that the order of the
Industrial Commission is contrary to law and that the
same should be reversed with instructions to award com·
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pensation in accordance with the Industrial Act, or
in the alternative, that the matter should be remanded
for further hearing.
Respectfully submitted,
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL
& McCARTHY
Grant Macfarlane, Jr.
Counsel for Plaintiff

39

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

